THEORETICAL OBSERVATORY

Defunctionalizations

This is a concept devised in 1984-85, which delves into the notion of “Meaning” as a term of encoding and common reference. Meaning depends exclusively on purpose. The meaning of a functioning object will not be the same as that of an intentionally broken object deprived of its function. By breaking the object, its meaning is automatically erased. The object in its original form is defined as “A-intact” with its meaning being “B-coherent.” The broken object becomes “A-mutated” while the original meaning, “B-coherent,” is annulled. The object, stripped of its function and meaning, takes on a new morphology and a new ontological determination. Its new aesthetics become its new meaning and its new function. It can then be defined as “C-native.” This results in an aesthetic and conceptual distortion caused by the morphological memory of the object in its original “A-intact” state. Despite the evident new meaning and function, the mind continues to recognize its previous morphology due to mnemonic information connected to its former meaning.

Analysis of Objectual Defunctionalization in Rospigliosi: A Semiological and Ontological Perspective

The approach within the field of "Defunctionalizations" offers a rigorous analytical framework for studying the nature of objectual meaning, examining how it is bound to function and how its alteration leads to semiotic and ontological transformations. The conceptual starting point is the idea that meaning does not constitute an intrinsic property of the object, but rather a variable dependent on its specific function within a given system. This perspective, of functionalist matrix, implies that objectual signification is not static, but dynamic and relational, resulting from the interaction of the object with its context of use. In this model, an object in its functional condition, designated as "A-intact," is associated with a "B-coherent" meaning. Such coherence is generated by the congruence between the formal structure of the object and its predetermined operational role. For example, a cutting tool possesses a coherent signification in relation to its effectiveness in executing the action of cutting, while a seat is defined in relation to its capacity to support the human body in a seated position. This correspondence between form and function generates a signification that is immediately intelligible and shared within a community of users. However, a perturbative variable is introduced: the intentional compromise of the objectual function through the act of breaking or exponential modification. This operation, defined as "defunctionalization," is not limited to the physical destruction of the object, but rather involves a radical destructuring of its original meaning. The transformed object, now "A-mutated," loses its "B-coherence," that is, its primary purpose. The damaged cutting tool is no longer suitable for cutting, and the destroyed seat no longer fulfills the function of support. The loss of function triggers a semiological deconstruction, forcing the observer to reconsider the ontological coordinates of the object. It is fundamental to specify that defunctionalization does not constitute a decontextualization. While decontextualization implies the temporary removal of the object from its original environment of use, maintaining intact its functional identity and allowing a return to the primary condition should the object be reintroduced into the appropriate context, defunctionalization instead involves a true and proper ontological resignification. The defunctionalized object can no longer recover its original function through a simple change of context, since it has undergone an irreversible transformation of its essence. Its identity is no longer that of departure: an ontological metamorphosis has occurred that has generated a new entity, endowed with a different nature and a different existential status. This transformation process is irreversible and definitive, clearly distinguishing itself from phenomena of decontextualization that maintain intact the possibility of a return to the original state. Nevertheless, this "death" of the original meaning triggers a process of semiotic and ontological recomposition. The defunctionalized object does not vanish into oblivion; on the contrary, it undergoes a metamorphosis, acquiring a new morphology and a new ontological determination. The object, deprived of its original destination, becomes "C-native." This new "nativity" does not constitute a simple reiteration of a pre-existing model, but a true and proper re-signification. Its new aesthetic configuration, its unprecedented way of manifesting itself, becomes its new meaning and its new function. The scrapped object, freed from its primary utility, liberates itself from the restrictions of its initial destination to assume a new value, a new role in the relational system that encompasses it. However, such a process of defunctionalization and re-signification does not manifest without consequences. A cognitive and aesthetic distortion is generated, deriving from the comparison between the current configuration of the object and its "A-intact" form of departure. The subject, while being able to identify the new meaning, cannot disregard the comparison with the previous state of the object, due to the mnemonic information correlated to its original function. This comparison triggers a perceptual conflict that hinders the fruition of the defunctionalized object with the same spontaneity and immediacy with which one approaches the experience of a functioning object. Perception, in this sense, is influenced by the memory of the object's past, as if the shadow of its original signification continued to project itself onto its new form. This perturbation, however, does not represent a limit, but rather a propulsive factor of analysis. The tension between old and new, between lost function and rediscovered form, creates an epistemological space suitable for reflection, interpretation, and the generation of new meanings. Defunctionalization, in this sense, can be interpreted as an act of liberation, through which objects transcend the reification of utilitarianism to project themselves into an unprecedented aesthetic and conceptual dimension. The analysis is not limited only to the description of a process, but invites a critical revision of the subject-object relationship, soliciting inquiry into the nature, value, and history of every entity. It proposes to review the world through a new optic, ready to capture complexity even in alteration, in the fragment, in what appears unused. In summary, the theory of defunctionalization highlights how meaning is not an objective and permanent property, but rather a dynamic and relational process, strictly dependent on the function and use of objects. Breaking, far from being a destructive act, becomes a motor of transformation and renewal, guiding objects toward new forms of expression and meaning.

Losing one’s function creates anxiety 1x. (Defunctionalization). 2001©. 60x12 cm, a wood saw with its teeth removed. Photographs of the installation 100x150 cm, digital print on plexiglass.